When the Lebanese prime minister and the EU's external relations commissioner sat down together in Brussels this week, they had plenty of subjects to discuss, if one common theme: change.

With Lebanon facing a burgeoning public debt and trying to emerge from a period of low growth - indeed, some recent surveys claim zero growth - Prime Minister Fouad Saniora is under pressure to convince potential international partners, investors and donors that in future, things are going to be quite different.

To help him in this unenviable task, Saniora has brought with him details of a new, five-year economic and political program. While still awaiting cabinet approval, Saniora's plans seem well tailored to EU expectations, with plenty of talk of privatization, structural change and a reigning in of debts and public expenditure.

It is very important for Lebanon to actively pursue an agenda of necessary political and economic reforms, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU commissioner for external relations and European neighborhood policy, told reporters in a statement. This, the commissioner argued, would ensure a more stable, prosperous and democratic future.

Many would heartily welcome such a development and, as Lebanon's largest trading partner as well as a major political influence in the region, the EU clearly has a major role in bringing this about.

Meanwhile, underscoring the importance of Saniora's ability to convince the Europeans are hopes that the visit might breathe fresh life into the long-postponed Beirut I donors conference.

This aims to replay the 2002 Paris II conference, when former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri led a successful effort to obtain a package of soft loans from Western and Arab governments.

The trip also comes ahead of the April 1 date for the entering into force of Lebanon's Association Agreement with the EU.

Some details of Saniora's program have also been emerging. First - and likely to cause the most immediate noticeable change for Lebanese consumers - is a proposed rise in value-added tax (VAT) from 10 to 15%, along with the removal of a ceiling on petrol prices. Taxes on interest rates on bank deposits will also rise from 5 to 8%.

At the same time, the privatization program is to be opened up full throttle, with Liban Telecom slated for sale by the middle of next year, while the central bank will sell its stake in Middle East Airlines (MEA) no later than 2008. The controversial Electricite du Liban (EDL) will also be transformed into a shareholding company in July 2006.

At the same time, the program envisages a drastic cut in state subsidies for EDL, which is estimated to be losing Lebanon around $1bn a year currently. The plan also calls for a new board of directors for the company and the establishment of another regulatory body to monitor EDL's performance.

When it comes to telecoms, under the program, the Telecommunications Ministry is to scrap its four-year contract with the MTC Touch and Alfa mobile networks, a move that will then enable the government to auction the services off, perhaps even before the end of 2006. All these moves are aimed at boosting government revenue, while simultaneously, moves will also be taken to slash expenditure. The five-year plan aims to bring this down from the current 30% of GDP to 26%.

To do this, there will be a freeze on recruitment to the public sector as well as redundancies, steps that are likely to anger unions and cause major social impact, given that around 20% of all Lebanese employees work for the public sector and/or military, according to most observers.

Another major drain on expenditure is debt servicing. Currently, the country has some $38bn of public debt, or 183% of GDP - the highest ratio anywhere in the world. Some of the country's leading economists also warned recently that this figure would rise to around $41bn by the end of this year if no action was taken.

But to service these loans, international rescheduling and consolidation of debts has to take place, with donor countries' soft loans enabling the country to pay off some of its steeper interest debts.

Thus Saniora's mission to Brussels is crucial, as Europe is the likeliest candidate to help out. At the same time, the World Bank and IMF have been clear that unless they are satisfied with the Lebanese government's plans, they will not be providing any major assistance.

Indeed, being happy with Saniora's plans is not clear-cut, even if the prime minister enjoys considerable support and confidence from the country's business leaders. As many point out, identifying the problem and even coming up with a solution has never really been the difficulty in Lebanon.

The problem has more been in pushing legislation through and implementing it, particularly when it cuts across particular political interests. With EDL, for example, a recent reason behind its huge losses has been that the country's power stations have been running on expensive fuel oil, imported at rocketing prices. Switching these stations over to natural gas is technically straightforward, as the stations are designed to take either, but securing a supply of gas has been far from easy.

A pipeline in from Syria was originally envisaged as providing this, yet this route has still not been secured, with the breakdown in political relations with Damascus in 2005 not helping.

However, Saniora's plan assumes that this will be sorted out soon and gas to the power stations has been factored in, radically cutting the costs of EDL. Yet it is by no means certain that the problem will be solved so rapidly. Nonetheless, there is evidence of a convergence in support for the approach the program takes, even if for Saniora to pull it off, he will have to do some serious persuading in Brussels - and elsewhere.