Paul Morcos, coordinator of the Lebanese Legislation Monitor, has suggested a basket of amendments to the banking-secrecy law and the law to fight money laundering which prevent exploiting banking secrecy in crimes, violations committed by transitory clients and debtors who are either defaulting or declared bankrupt.

Nov. 04, 2006- Analyzing the conceivable role of banking secrecy following the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and the collapse of Bank Al-Madina, Morcos also suggests mechanisms for the efficacy of the accountability and transparency of both senior functionaries and politicians.

Morcos, who heads the legal affairs unit at the Bank of Beirut and the Arab Countries, emphasizes that the suggested legal amendments and new mechanisms are aimed at preventing the misuse of the right to banking secrecy but not eliminating or reducing it.

These amendments are,

consequently, in favor of the very same banking secrecy established to protect banks' clients who engage in sound financial interactions.

It was intended to attract legal funds, and at no time aimed to protect dirty funds nor to transform Lebanon into a haven for criminals.

For example: embezzlers vis-a-vis penal courts; defaulting borrowers versus their lenders to prevent the latter from distraining their deposits; bankrupt merchants opposed to creditors in order to traffic their money to other clients benefiting from banking secrecy; or corrupt politicians ("potentates") opposed to inspection and investigation authorities.

Morcos also introduces taxation and financial solutions vis-a-vis the fiscal authorities without affecting banking secrecy in this respect.

He presents these suggestions in a doctorate dissertation in private law, which he earned "with honors."

What distinguishes the dissertation is its emphasis, from a comparative perspective in at least seven countries, on the recent developments pertaining to banking secrecy in the areas of fighting money laundering and terror financing; the fleeing of capital from the United States after the attacks of September 11,2001; the high taxation imposed by the European Union on bank interest rates in a number of European countries against their maintaining banking secrecy; and the tendency of many Arab countries to adopt rules of banking secrecy recently, etc. These new developments raised many problems internationally, upon which, from a certain point of view, the traditional rules of banking secrecy would be reconsidered.

Morcos brings up the notion of "re-sketching the boundaries of banking secrecy" since there should be a limit for each rule of law; otherwise, right would turn to abuse (e.g. Bank Al-Madina, Hariri assassination).

Morcos concludes that banking secrecy in Lebanon is still one of the international regulations most protective for the bank's client. Its strictness exceeded even that applied in Switzerland and Luxembourg, especially as opposed to judicial and fiscal authorities and the clients' family members.