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Self-hating Lebanese - a peculiar national malady |
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Written by Talal Nizameddin
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A good example is the British journalist Robert Fisk, who likes to remind us every few articles that he has spent 31 years in Beirut, but casually refers to Lebanon as a country "carved out of Syria" following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Mar. 12, 2007- First person by Talal Nizameddin - Since 1943, the Lebanese have been taught to hate themselves. The unrelenting psychological pressure has led to socio-political personality disorders that are threatening Lebanon with an impending implosion. Today's political crisis is merely a continuation of the state of denial that so many Lebanese prefer to live in. This collective self-hating is best reflected in the way criticisms are directed by some political leaders against others in today's ferocious dispute.
The Lebanese self-haters fall into several categories. There are those who since modern independence have felt a deep sense of shame at being merely bastard creations of an Anglo-French drunken bout of map desecration that came to be known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This group was founded by members of the region's minority communities, particularly Orthodox Christians, desperate to distance themselves from anything Western.
During the 1950s, Lebanon's Sunnis found an attraction in a mythological pan-Arab empire that was invented by Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt.
Lebanese nationalism then became a burdensome and unnatural obstacle toward an Arab super-state that could rival the USSR and the US. While Nasser became discredited, Arab nationalism remains central in Lebanon's political language. The Taif Accord insists on emphasizing Lebanon's Arab status. MP Saad Hariri, like his martyred father, feels the need to assert Lebanon's Arabness in every speech. This trend is emulated by virtually all of Lebanon's Sunni leaders as well as Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. One could be led to believe that it is less of a taboo to question Lebanon's existence, and the Kawmieh (NSSP) does openly, than to question its Arabness.
Since the 1980s, the Shiites have found their own external source for salvation in the form of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Whether real or merely propaganda, there is now talk of a Shiite-dominated crescent spanning from Iran to Lebanon. What is fact is that the Iranian brand of Shiite Islam diminishes the status of European nationalism and replaces it with a spiritual and religious affinity that is inspired by the first Imam Ali, whose spirit transcends to descendents who are alive and well today and are playing the role of active political leaders. Little Lebanon seems to fade in the midst of this greater historic and regional charge of the rapidly growing and dynamically zealous Shiite community.
It is most likely that this overwhelming desire to latch on to wider regional powers is due to a deep insecurity about being so small. The innovative yet proud Lebanese may be saying to himself that it is better to be a part of a movement than to be overrun by it. But it is this pathological fear that has kept Lebanon's communities at each other's throats for centuries, and allowed regional and international powers to exploit them so easily for their own wider interests.
No one would seriously deny Lebanon's Arabness. The problem is that there is a totalitarian rejection of anything un-Arab about Lebanon. Ask an Arab linguist to explain the meaning of the hundreds of Lebanese villages and towns and it is likely they would be at a loss. Sincere Arab historians recognize the distinct history of this patch of land from Arabia, North Africa and even Syria dating back to the fishing and trading settlements of what the West calls the Phoenicians. Even the language and alphabet that we use today in Lebanon is relatively new and imported. That is why Lebanese literature ultimately ends up being Arab literature, acting as a barrier to expressing the impulses and distinct emotions of someone born in this land. But it is pointless to enter into a historic debate about cultural origins since it is as difficult to turn the nonbeliever into a believer as it is the other way around, as it is argued concerning the existence of God.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb
Nationalism derives from intensive bouts of psycho-analysis. It is about shared experiences. In a Freudian sense, it is about our mothers' voice and intonations while we rest in her womb. It is about the shape of our father's nose while he bottle-feeds us. It is about the values we soak up as children. It is about a sense of belonging and ultimately love for what is around us. All these intangibles are too easy to discredit when faced with a barrage of ideological speech-making.
Faced by such a relentless assault, most of Lebanon's political leaders today have looked for outside cover: Hariri is linked with Saudi Arabia, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah with Iran, and then there is the assortment of pro-Syrian groups. MP Michel Aoun, like President Emile Lahoud, is in words at least an admirer of the Napoleonic model of a centralized and militarized secular state that leaves little room for Lebanon's cultural idiosyncrasies. Even Western Orientalists studying or working in Lebanon seem to not quite take the country's independence seriously enough. A good example is the British journalist Robert Fisk, who likes to remind us every few articles that he has spent 31 years in Beirut, but casually refers to Lebanon as a country "carved out of Syria" following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
It is interesting that Fisk isolates Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces for particularly harsh vitriol, casting aside journalistic restraint by referring to him as the "killer Geagea." There is a long line of Western academics and writers who would like to caricature Geagea as the Radovan Karadic of the Middle East. Druze leader MP Walid Jumblatt, rather ironically, is being painted by the same brush that paints Geagea. For the refined left-leaning modern political thinkers, Jumblatt and Geagea are simply wild men from the mountains whose parochial backwardness holds back meaningful social development and justice.
The worst forms of personal attacks by the opposition in the current political crisis are also directed at Geagea and Jumblatt. Many Lebanese seem to find both men difficult to stomach, but without offering a logical reason as to why they are particularly singled out. Where they do differ from all the leaders mentioned above, whether from March 8 or 14, is that neither have political, ideological or financial roots outside of Lebanon. Like their ancestors, the mountain offers sanctuary and that sanctuary is a primitive nonintellectualized way of meaning freedom. Freedom from oppression and from outside domination in order to have the freedom to practice what they want to practice and to be what they want to be. That, after all, is Lebanon's purpose and mission and what makes it distinct in the region. The crime of these two men has been to fight, sometimes brutally, to protect and maintain their historic sanctuary. It is a peculiar malady indeed that this sanctuary, which all Lebanese without exception need so much, is hated so intensely by some Lebanese.
By Talal Nizaneddin
Talal Nizameddin is assistant dean of student affairs at the American University of Beirut.
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