Home  Opinion The transformation of Lebanon's Sunnis |
|
The transformation of Lebanon's Sunnis |
|
|
Written by Daily Star
|
With the recent conclusion of the Nahr al-Bared battle, it is fascinating to reflect upon the overt changes undergone by the Lebanese Sunni community as a result of the Hariri assassination and the army's conflict with Fatah al-Islam. In a sense, we have been witnessing the outward manifestations of a process long in the making: the "Lebanonization" of the Sunni community.
No longer is Lebanese nationalism a Christian preserve, and gone is the old Sunni disdain for Lebanon as a colonial or Maronite entity. In their hearts, Lebanese Sunnis may have soured on Arab nationalism and Syrian hegemony long ago, but it took the Hariri assassination for their simmering discontent to explode into action.
Curiously, Sunni leaders have yet to discard the worn-out slogans of causes they no longer truly espouse. This sometimes creates a degree of incongruity with the current situation. When leading figures of the Future Movement eulogize Rafik Hariri and Walid Eido as "martyrs for Arabism," this exemplifies the lingering influence of ideas seared into the minds of generations of Arabs. Needless to say, Hariri and Eido were killed precisely for opposing Lebanon's subjugation to Arabism, specifically its Syrian variant. Yet apart from habit, maintaining a nominal loyalty to Arabism reflects a desire on the part of Sunni leaders to avoid a complete rupture with Lebanese Sunni history.
Insofar as one can characterize the politico-ideological orientation of an entire community, the Sunnis of Lebanon have historically been supporters of Arab nationalism. When Greater Lebanon was established in 1920, many Sunnis clamored for reunification with Syria. The National Pact of 1943, which constituted an agreement between Maronite and Sunni elites over an independent Lebanon, helped generate bourgeois Sunni backing for the new entity. Later, the assassination by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Prime Minister Riad al-Solh, who along with President Bishara al-Khoury was co-architect of the pact, led to an increase in Sunni support for continued Lebanese independence.
Yet most Sunnis remained committed to pan-Arab causes, including that of outright unity with other Arab countries. During the 1958 civil conflict, Sunnis distinguished themselves from the rest of the opposition by calling for Lebanon's unification with the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria. In the late 1960s, when Palestinian militias began using Lebanon as a base for launching cross-border attacks on Israel, they drew much of their support from Lebanon's Sunnis, who considered the Palestinian struggle against Israel the Arab cause par excellence. When the Civil War erupted in 1975, it pitted a Lebanese nationalist side composed largely of Christians against a pro-Palestinian and Arab nationalist camp of which Lebanese Sunnis were the staunchest advocates.
During the Civil War, however, Lebanese Sunnis began to reconsider previously sacrosanct issues, including the Palestinian cause. Concurrently, the Syrian Army's behavior - from its destruction of Tripoli during fighting with Islamists to its policy in Beirut of supporting the Shiite Amal over Sunni factions like the Murabitoun - alienated Sunnis from Syria. The postwar coddling of Hizbullah didn't help matters, nor did the continued detention in Syria of Lebanese Sunnis who had been aligned with anti-Syrian factions. Finally, the postwar marginalization of Sunni politicians, including Hariri himself after 1998, fostered a sense of siege among Sunnis. Dissatisfaction mounted steadily; but only when Hariri was killed did the levee break and Sunni anger burst forth.
Ironically, if Syria ends up being absolved of responsibility for the assassination of Hariri, the Lebanese will be left to grapple with the unnerving realization that they owe their independence to a misdirected accusation. From 1990, when the Civil War ended, until 2005, when mass demonstrations liberated Lebanon, opposition to the Syrian presence was largely a Christian phenomenon, with sporadic Druze participation. Only when they suspected Damascus of felling their community's leader did Sunnis change tack and join their Christian and Druze compatriots.
Sunni participation in the Cedar Revolution ensured the latter's triumph; no longer able to portray the drive for Lebanese independence as a "sectarian" Christian affair, Syria immediately buckled under the pressure of a majority-Sunni Arab world. Yet the Lebanese Sunni demand that Syria withdraw from Lebanon because it orchestrated Hariri's assassination obscured Lebanon's intrinsic right to independence.
Yet Sunni rhetoric quickly transcended the assassination and assumed an overall Lebanese nationalist tone. However, the more accurate barometer of a metamorphosis among Lebanese Sunnis will be their reaction to a post-Baath Syria. When the Baath regime of Syria falls, will Lebanese Sunnis revert to the Arab nationalism of old and return to the idea that the Lebanese and Syrian peoples are one? To what extent would Lebanese Sunnis rediscover an affinity for Syria if that country's majority Sunni population enjoyed a greater share of political power?
A volte-face on the issue of Lebanon's sovereignty is unlikely. By now, most Lebanese Sunnis consider Lebanon a legitimate country. The challenge will be of a different sort: Lebanese Sunnis will have to resist the temptation to enlist the aid of a Sunni-dominated Syria against Lebanese Shiite or Christian rivals. This could prompt Lebanese Sunnis to view Syria the way it is viewed by many Lebanese Shiites today: as a guarantor of their power and an ally in internal Lebanese politicking.
This is why the Lebanese Sunni reaction to a post-Baath Syria will be critical. If Lebanese Sunnis fend off recrudescent calls for unification with Syria while simultaneously refusing to solicit Syrian support for achieving internal Lebanese objectives, the Lebanonization of the Sunnis will have been complete and irrevocable.
Rayyan al-Shawaf is a freelance writer and reviewer based in Beirut. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
Written by Rayyan al-Shawaf , http://www.dailystar.com.lb
|
|
|
Madness takes over Lebanon.
Militants are fighting in the streets of Beirut. Military guns are on both sides. What is the prospect of such a situation. Aren't the Lebanese fed-up with wars?
23 November 2007
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud left the Baabda presidential palace without handing over the power to a new president. This is the first time since independence in 1943. |
advertisements
|
