Home  Opinion what 1701 means for Lebanon's security |
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what 1701 means for Lebanon's security |
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Written by George Jallad
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Open to interpretation: what 1701 means for Lebanon's security
As The Daily Star went to press, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was preparing to release his report on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. This article by George Jallad illustrates the uncertainties about how the resolution will be interpreted and how these might affect its contribution to stability.
As soon as the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government publicly declared that it had achieved a diplomatic victory by amending the draft resolution presented by the US and France from Chapter VII to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. What are the reasons behind the government's initiation of a fierce diplomatic war to change the draft resolution to Chapter VI, and was it successful in doing so?
Before answering the above questions, it is essential to shed some light upon the difference between the Council's decisions under Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI comes under the title "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." Accordingly, a decision issued by the Council under this Chapter cannot be implemented without the clear consent of the conflicting parties. Such a decision usually includes peaceful ways of settling disputes such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration, in addition to other means mentioned under Article 33 of the Charter.
Chapter VII, on the other hand, comes under the title "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression." According to this Chapter, the Security Council can impose its decisions upon the conflicting parties despite their will and thus limit the sovereignty of states by threatening and using nonmilitary and military coercive actions. Because of the serious consequences that result from such a resolution, the Charter imposes upon the Council to determine that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression before enforcing its decisions on the conflicting parties pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter. If the conflicting parties do not comply with the Council's provisional measures under Chapter VII, the Council can intervene in the domestic affairs of the states by imposing economic and military sanctions against the violator. This may explain the Lebanese government's reservations on the Chapter VII draft resolution submitted by the US and France. A Chapter VII resolution might intervene in the domestic affairs of Lebanon through obliging the government of Lebanon to use all means to disarm Hizbullah, which will further deteriorate the situation in Lebanon.
It is important to mention that no Chapter VII resolution can be issued without the Council's determination that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the Peace, Breach of the Peace, or an act of aggression pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter. Do we find such a determination in the resolution under study? Resolution 1701 stipulates in its premises that the Council, "Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security..." In this paragraph, the Council clearly triggered a Chapter VII resolution by making an Article 39 determination. Not only did the Council apply Article 39 which falls under Chapter VII, but it also adopted Article 40 which states: "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before ... deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable."
In UNSCR 1701, we can identify various provisional measures to be respected by the parties involved in this conflict: Israel, Hizbullah, Lebanon and the international community.
First, with respect to Israel, the resolution "calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon... the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations." It further calls upon the Government of Israel, as the Lebanese government deploys its forces throughout the South, "to withdraw all its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel." The resolution also "calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution" based upon several principles and elements mentioned in the same resolution.
Second, with respect to Hizbullah, the resolution calls for an "immediate cessation by Hizbullah of all attacks."
Third, with respect to Lebanon, the resolution "calls upon the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL... to deploy their forces together throughout the South" upon the full cessation of hostilities. In addition, it calls for Lebanon to support a permanent cease-fire with Israel based upon the principles mentioned in the resolution. It further "Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materials..."
Fourth, the Security Council in its resolution 1701 "Calls the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons... reopening airports and harbors..." It is important to mention that the Security Council in calling upon all states to take the above measures obliges Israel as a part of the international community to take immediate steps to facilitate the return of refugees and to cease its embargo upon the Lebanese airports and harbors.
These provisional measures must be respected by all parties concerned in this dispute because as explained earlier, this resolution is issued under Chapter VII and is thus considered binding for the states concerned. But what if one of these parties violates the provisions of the resolution? Article 41 of the Charter explicitly states that "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations..." Furthermore, if these measures proved to be ineffective, the Council may take military action by air, sea, or land forces pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter. The UNSCR 1707 in its Paragraph 15 invokes the spirit of Article 41 when its calls upon all States to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related material to any entity or individual in Lebanon in addition to any technical training relating to the manufacture, maintenance, and use of arms. Accordingly, the Council cannot take such a measure unless acting under a Chapter VII resolution.
UNSCR 1701 is a very important and dangerous resolution because any infringement to its provisions may pave the way for coercive sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the violator. This explains the fear of the Lebanese government of a Chapter VII resolution which may impose upon the government certain difficult obligations such as disarming Hizbullah - a highly equipped military resistance according to the Lebanese government and an illegal militant militia according to the international community. Such a resolution may have enormous repercussions upon the Lebanese solidarity if Hizbullah fails to accept disarmament through negotiation, especially since Hizbullah is supported by a large proportion of the Lebanese society. This scenario may force Lebanon into a new version of a civil war.
Not only did the Lebanese government misinterpret the resolution, the Israeli government also fell into some misconception when it considered that the resolution fulfilled its goals in Lebanon. This resolution is precarious for Israel since it is the only Chapter VII resolution related to the Israeli-Lebanese conflict since the creation of Israel. Under this resolution, Israel becomes obliged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and thus must cease its frequent violations of the Lebanese borders under the penalty of the Council's activation of its Chapter VII coercive measures. It is important to mention that many Security Council resolutions were issued that demanded Israel to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon such as UNSCR 425 (1978) and 520 (1982). However, none of these resolutions had the power of the present resolution 1701 since they were all issued under Chapter VI of the Charter and were thus not self-binding to Israel. If Israel violates its obligations under UNSCR 1701, it risks subjecting itself to Chapter VII sanctions of the UN Charter. Whether Israel or Lebanon implements this resolution or not, both must take into consideration the grave repercussions that may result from the violation of the first Chapter VII resolution presiding over the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.
By George Jallad
Tuesday, September 12, 2006
Analysis by George Jallad
George Jallad is an expert on international affairs and international law and is a lecturer at the Lebanese American University.
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